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government did not shed
these new understandings at
the end of the Civil War, and
the government now appears
just as reluctant to abandon
them at the end of the Cold
War.
America transformed its legal and governmental structure in
response to the perceived dangers of Soviet expansionism in the
decades after World War II. The Cold War lasted so long, and
so many people believed that it would last indefinitely, that
precious little thought was given during this struggle to how the
nation would restructure itself once the emergency had passed.
The American Civil War provides a powerful model for thinking
about the transformations that took place during the Cold War
and about how a transformation back to peacetime law can be
made now.
Both the Civil War and the Cold War fostered a pervasive
sense of crisis centered on the premise that resort to
undemocratic measures was necessary to save the nation.
Spurred by the felt necessities of wartime, this way of thinking
prioritized action over contemplation, and effectiveness over
consultation. Proponents argued that war sped up time and
shrank space. Responding as quickly as possible to national
crises was both necessary and desirable, even at the expense of
compromise and deliberation. Wartime emergency measures
could appropriately apply to people far from actual fighting.
This mentality drove fundamental restructuring of the
national government. In the Cold War, as in the Civil War, the
government expanded its power and reach dramatically. On the
assumption that the executive was best suited to act quickly and
decisively, Lincoln and the Cold War Presidents concentrated
this power in themselves. Congress and the courts both accepted
executive supremacy in wartime and regeared their own
operations to meet the demands of national emergency.
Although perceived military necessity provoked such
intellectual and structural transformations, the national
government did not shed these new understandings at the end of
the Civil War, and the government now appears just as reluctant
to abandon them at the end of the Cold War. After the Civil War,
Congress was not eager to surrender the ease and efficiency of
wartime decision-making, and the President was weak or only
weakly committed to restoring the rule of law. Having dismissed
deliberation and compromise as mere extravagances in wartime,
resurrecting their importance in peace became far from automatic.
Our Civil War experience should lead us to expect that our
transition back to peace will be neither easy nor smooth. The
return to peacetime law after the Civil War was neither, even
though the emergency measures taken during this much shorter
war were explicitly temporary. The Civil War shows us that the
transition back after a massive national emergency can be made.
But it suggests, above all else, that such a transformation will be
difficult and slow without deliberate government action and
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careful planning about both the ending of emergency law and the
shaping of peacetime rules. Restructuring our nation for
peacetime, thinking about and planning the future, is presumably
not a radical suggestion, but we have done too little of it thus far.
The history of the Civil War both suggests just how dangerous
this can be and offers concrete lessons for reestablishing the rule
of law now.
I. Emergency Power in the Civil War
A. An Immediate Response to a "clear, flagrant, and
gigantic case of Rebellion"
From the start, President Abraham Lincoln responded to the
crisis of the Civil War by claiming exponentially augmented
powers for the federal government and by consolidating this
power in himself. He avoided congressional consultation on the
assumption that Congress could not respond to the crisis quickly
enough and out of fear that congressmen might not agree to do
what Lincoln knew was necessary to preserve the Union.
Lincoln effectively implemented emergency rule in just the
first eleven weeks of the Civil War. His first step after the April
12, 1861 firing on Fort Sumter was to decide that Congress, then
in recess, should not reconvene as soon as possible. Lincoln's
executive proclamation of April 15 called for a special session of
Congress to address the secession crisis, but one that would not
meet until July 4.' Presumably, Lincoln hoped he could resolve
the crisis by then. Lincoln's next move was to institute a
blockade on Confederate ports on April 19, an action hitherto
regarded as both unconstitutional and contrary to international
law except in declared, foreign wars.2 The next day, he assumed
two core congressional functions. Lincoln directed that nineteen
ships be added to the navy,3 although the Constitution directs
Congress "[t]o provide and maintain" this force.4 Suspicious of
the loyalty of the national bureaucracy, he also ordered the
Treasury Secretary to advance two million dollars to three private
citizens "to be used by them in meeting such requisitions as
should be directly consequent upon the military and naval
measures necessary for the defence and support of the
government."5  Such an expenditure without congressional
appropriation or authorization was, of course, contrary to the
constitutional provision that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury but in consequence of Appropriations made by Law."6
On April 27, in response to secessionist activity in
Baltimore-Washington, D.C.'s link to the rest of the
Union-Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in the area,7
the first of four such presidential proclamations made in the first
eleven weeks of the war, and the first of eight made over the
course of the war.' Finally, on May 3, Lincoln called for
volunteers for the regular army, although Congress had not
authorized an expansion of the armed forces."
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Acceding to Lincoln's unilateral restructuring of federal
power and the crisis mentality of the times, Congress exercised
no effective restraint on the President after it reconvened and
adopted emergency measures of its own. On August 6, 1861,
Congress sustained all of Lincoln's post-Sumter actions
"respecting the army and navy of the United States," declaring
them "hereby approved and in all respects legalized and made
valid, to the same intent and with the same effect as if they had
been issued and done under the previous express authority and
direction of the Congress of the United States."' l Although many
believed that only Congress could suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, Congress did not address that issue until two years into
the war when Lincoln had already suspended the writ seven
times. While the March 3, 1863 "Act relating to Habeas Corpus"
did not concede that the President had such authority, it
authorized future suspensions and its net effect was to legitimize
his previous proclamations. " This Act also declared that properly
enforcing wartime executive orders or legislation would be a
defense in civil suits brought against federal officers 2 and
directed that suits involving official indemnity be transferred to
federal courts. 3 While unsurprising today, these latter provisions
represented, like the habeas corpus authorization, unprecedented
exercises of federal power. Under traditional American law,
military officers sued for such trespasses as false imprisonment
and unwarranted seizures could not use a superior's orders as a
defense and were personally liable for damages 4 (although they
were frequently reimbursed by Congress). 5 Such suits became
common during the Civil War, prompting Congress to take its
unusual action. 6
National leaders tended to understand such dramatic
assertions of wartime power in one of three ways. The first view,
propounded most prominently by Congressmen Thaddeus
Stevens and Charles Sumner, held that while the Constitution did
not provide for any emergency powers beyond those explicitly
enumerated, 7 it simply did not control matters related to the
suppression of the rebellion. Stevens once declared that he
"would not stultify" himself by pretending that a certain wartime
measure was constitutional, and then voted for it anyway.'
Sumner shared such sentiments. "Glorious as it is that the citizen
is surrounded by the safeguards of the Constitution,"
constitutional rights, Sumner argued, were "superseded by war
which brings into being other rights which know no master." 9 A
popular literature quickly developed in support of this position,
with much of the material arguing that Union victory required the
wartime suspension of the Constitution. As the Continental
Monthly editorialized, a "[g]reat crisis required great measures."
2
1
While historians have tended to view Stevens and Sumner as
"extremist" advocates of the war power,2' their constitutional
position was in fact the most long-established in America. In the
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
the dominant constitutional paradigm
featured a sharp separation between the rule
of law and crisis government. This "liberal
constitutionalism" recognized that the
executive would have to take far-reaching
actions in the most serious national
emergencies and posited that the integrity of
the Constitution could best be preserved by
limiting its application to peacetime. While
the President had no constitutional
emergency authority, he could act outside
the Constitution in grave crises.22 Stevens
and Sumner were well within this tradition.
The second view of war powers
prominent during the Civil War shared
Stevens's and Sumner's conviction that the
Constitution granted no emergency
authority beyond that specified, but held that
the Constitution retained its supremacy in
wartime. Proponents argued that almost all
of Lincoln's emergency measures were
unconstitutional and demanded that they be
immediately abandoned. Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney's opinion in Ex parte
Merryman (1861) was the most important














significant piece of opposition literature written during the
war.
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On April 19, 1861, pro-secession mobs in Baltimore
prevented Union troops from passing through the city on their
way to guard Washington, D.C. That night, local authorities
burned Baltimore's most important railroad bridges-the capital's
sole connection to the North and West--supposedly to protect the
city from Union troops seeking revenge for the day's rioting.'
On April 27, Lincoln authorized the suspension of habeas corpus
"at any point or in the vicinity of any military line which is now
or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the
city of Washington."' Under this authorization, John Merryman,
suspected of organizing a secessionist troop movement, was taken
into military custody on May 25. He immediately petitioned
Taney, on circuit in Baltimore, for a writ of habeas corpus.2"
Stipulating that he was acting as a Supreme Court Justice from
chambers rather than as a circuit judge, Taney issued the writ the
next day 7 When he was disobeyed because of the President's
April 27 directive,2 Taney wrote an opinion challenging the
constitutionality of Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus.
Taney denied Lincoln's authority to reassign powers within
the national government or to go beyond the powers enumerated
in the Constitution. According to him, "the necessity of
government, for self-defence in times of
tumult and danger" did nothing to increase
executive power. The government, Taney
argued, "derives its existence and authority
altogether from the constitution, and neither
of its branches, executive, legislative, or
judicial, can exercise any of the powers of
government beyond those specified and
granted."29 The Founders did not provide for
general emergency rule or martial law
because the only efficiency they were
concerned about was that the Constitution
"guard still more efficiently the rights and
liberties of the citizen, against executive
encroachment and oppression."3 ° For this
reason, the Constitution authorized only
Congress to suspend habeas corpus.3' Taney
concluded by rejecting the notion that
unconstitutional methods could help preserve
the Constitution. Declaring the overriding of
civil processes when civil courts functioned
military usurpation, he warned that
unconstitutional stratagems of this sort would
only undermine what they intended to save.
Permitting such usurpation would destroy the
"government of laws," leaving "every citizen
hold[ing] life, liberty and property at the will
and pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he may
happen to be found."32 For his parting shot, the Justice had a
copy of his opinion sent to the President.3
The third, and dominant, view of war powers espoused
during the Civil War agreed with Taney that the Constitution was
binding in war, but argued that it was a flexible document that
allowed the President to take necessary emergency action. This
approach, labeled the "adequacy-of-the-Constitution" position
soon after Sumter,' held that the Constitution had been
misinterpreted since its ratification. Southerners had focused too
much attention on the prohibitions in the Constitution. Adequacy
writers stressed that the Constitution also imposed positive duties
upon the national government.35 The government had a
responsibility to maintain itself as the base for a more perfect
Union,36 to guarantee to every state a republican form of
government, 37 and to provide for the general welfare .3' The
President, in particular, was obligated to see that the laws were
faithfully executed and to carry out his oath to preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution to the best of his ability. War
powers, as far-reaching as necessary to preserve the Union, were
entirely consistent with the Constitution."
Lincoln was always the most effective advocate of adequacy
constitutionalism. Throughout the war, the President insisted
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that his emergency measures did not exceed what the Consti-
tution allowed.4 "[C]ertain proceedings are constitutional," he
argued in response to critics of the suspension of habeas corpus,
"when, in cases of rebellion or Invasion, the public Safety
requires them," although they would not be constitutional
otherwise.42 The Founding Fathers themselves "plainly"
endorsed such an interpretation, as demonstrated by their
provision for the suspension of habeas corpus in national
emergencies.43 Indeed, important powers and positive duties
placed on the national government in times of crisis pervaded the
Constitution. Lincoln argued in his July 4, 1861 message to
Congress, in classic adequacy constitutionalism form, that the
United States could only fulfill its constitutional responsibility
to guarantee to every state a republican form of government" by
keeping the states in the Union. Preventing a state's secession
was "an indispensable means, to the end, of maintaining the
guaranty mentioned; and when an end is lawful and obligatory,
the indispensable means to it, are also lawful, and obligatory." 5
Lincoln was equally confident that "the strong measures" to
which he had resorted were in fact "indispensable to the public
Safety." There were two, equally important, components to this
claim. The first was an insistence that the national government
was not trampling on any personal liberties unnecessarily. The
second was that some significant trampling was required to
preserve the Union. Lincoln's response to his critics was that he,
too, was "devotedly for" the "safe-guards of the rights of the
citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary power.., after civil
war, and before civil war, and at all times 'except when, in cases
of Rebellion or Invasion, the public Safety may require' their
suspension." '7  Lincoln harbored no doubts that the "clear,
flagrant, and gigantic case of Rebellion"' the nation faced
required extensive executive action. "We are contending," he
wrote, "with an enemy, who.., drives every able bodied man he
can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks
into a slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used."49
As early as the end of 1861, Lincoln's adequacy
constitutionalism dominated the executive branch and Congress.
In 1863, in a case which replicated in miniature the struggle
between Lincoln and Taney on the war power, the Supreme Court
sided with this majority, further legitimating the politicians' crisis
mentality and governmental restructuring. The Prize Cases0
involved a challenge to the legality of Lincoln's blockade order.
The lawyers for the shipowners whose vessels and cargo had
been seized reiterated the essence of Taney's argument in
Merryman, contending that the executive was limited to those
powers specifically granted by the Constitution and observing
that the authority to declare a blockade was not such a power."'
Lincoln's defense, of course, was that the blockade order was
within his constitutional authority because he needed such power
in order to fight secession. 2 Justice Grier, writing for a majority
of the Court, agreed that the Constitution did not stand in the way
of an effective Union war effort. Although the common
understanding before this case had been that blockades were only
constitutional in declared, foreign wars, and the Civil War lacked
both a foreign enemy and a congressional declaration of war,
Grier wrote that "[t]he proclamation of blockade is itself official
and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of war existed
which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure,
under the circumstances peculiar to the case." 3 The President
had the constitutional authority, as commander in chief and chief
executive officer, to recognize national emergencies and confront
them quickly and effectively.
B. Civil War Battlefields
The triumph of adequacy constitutionalism in the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the national government
during the Civil War affected citizens throughout the United
State. For the national government, in word and deed, extended
the "battlefield" where wartime measures were operative far
beyond actual battle sites. In the process, it starkly revealed the
potential dangers inherent in a doctrine that placed no constraints
on the state's power to assess and counter national emergencies,
relying instead on national leaders to impose appropriate limits on
themselves.
Anxious to establish his absolute discretion to determine
what was necessary to preserve the Union, Lincoln's official
rhetoric about the extent of war powers was particularly far-
reaching and indiscriminate. As early as October 14, 1861,
Lincoln wrote the commanding general of the Union army that
"[t]he military line of the United States for the suppression of the
insurrection may be extended so far as Bangor in Maine."
Lincoln authorized the general, or any officer acting under his
authority, "to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any place
between that place and the city of Washington."5" No obvious
specific incident motivated this order, and it came six weeks
before Lincoln suspended habeas corpus in Missouri, a critical
border state that saw guerilla violence and perpetual military
campaigns from the beginning of the war.55 In September 1862,
Lincoln broadened the geographic scope of the suspension to
include "all Rebels and Insurgents, their aiders and abettors
within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer
enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal
practice" wherever found 6
Congress and the Supreme Court displayed their own, more
limited, expansiveness. The March 3, 1863 Habeas Corpus Act
authorized the writ's suspension "throughout the United States,
or any part thereof," 7 but attempted (unsuccessfully) to place
limits on the President's power to detain "citizens of states in
which the administration of the laws has continued unimpaired
in the ... Federal courts." 8 The Supreme Court held in the
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Prize Cases (1863) that all residents of
the Confederate states "whose property
may be used to increase the revenues
of the hostile power are, in this
contest, liable to be treated as enemies."
Their property could be seized
regardless of their personal
allegiances. "
But the army's official proclamations
about its war powers were the most
sweeping by the end of the conflict. On
August 16, 1864, Ulysses Grant, by then
the commanding general of the Union
army, declared that essentially all
southern males of draftable age, which
included those seventeen to fifty, would
be treated as combatants. The order
thoroughly blurred the line between
civilians and soldiers, but perhaps it is
not surprising that Grant issued such a
directive. With all other considerations
subordinated to military needs during the
Civil War, he may have come to believe
that there were no limits on his power to
prosecute the war. While Grant's order
The reigning elite
argued that the only
way the country could




was to abandon some
of the very
democratic processes
which the nation was
fighting to preserve.
apparently did not lead to blanket military arrests,' it stands as
the pinnacle of the national government's progressive expansion
during the Civil War of the battlefield where wartime rules
applied.
Lincoln's political rhetoric fully supported this official
expansionism. Indeed, in an 1863 public letter defending military
arrests, Lincoln seemed almost paranoiac, declaring that at the
outbreak of the war "[Confederate] sympathizers pervaded all
departments of the government, and nearly all communities of the
people."61 He went on to insist that military arrests were
constitutional wherever the public safety does require
thenm--as well in places to which they may prevent the
rebellion extending, as in those where it may be already
prevailing-as well where they may restrain
mischievous interference with the raising and supplying
of armies, to suppress the rebellion, as where the
rebellion may actually be-as well where they may
restrain the enticing men out of the army, as where they
would prevent mutiny in the army.62
Or, as Lincoln put it in a now-famous metaphor: "Must I shoot a
simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a
hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? ... I think that
in such a case, to silence the agitator, and save the boy, is not




Not surprisingly given such sentiments,
the practical effect of Lincoln's wartime
measures extended significantly beyond the
actual battlefield. Fortunately, this expan-
sion was more cautious and calibrated than
Lincoln's official and political rhetoric
suggested. Having asserted his unchecked
power to preserve the Union by whatever
means necessary, Lincoln actually exercised
his discretion more reasonably.
The North, militarily secure for the great
majority of the war, saw a relatively small
percentage of military arrests and trials.
Mark E. Neely, Jr.'s study of 866 people
arrested by the military in the first ten
months of the war' found that a maximum of
18.4% of the prisoners were from states
north of the (always volatile) border states.65
Five percent of the at least 4,271 trials
conducted by military commission during the
war took place in the North.'
The strife-tom border states were much
more strictly controlled. Neely found that
citizens from those states accounted for more than 40.5% of the
military arrests he studied.67 More than half (55.5%) of the trials
by military commission conducted during the war occurred in
Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland, with 46.2% occurring in
turbulent Missouri alone.68
Military controls were as severe in the Confederate states.
Although the Union army's control over the South was very
limited in the first year of the war, Neely found that 26.3% of the
people arrested in the first ten months of the conflict were citizens
of Confederate states, either residents of areas the Union army
already occupied or southerners in the North when the war
began. 69 However, wartime measures did distinguish southern
unionists from their secessionist neighbors. The Supreme Court
sanctioned the capture of all property located in the South.7" But
Congress's ultimate Captured and Abandoned Property Act
authorizing military seizures in the Confederacy provided for the
restoration of loyal citizens' property.71
C. Thinking About Peace
Lincoln's extension of military controls is typical of the
larger pattern of his war power policies. Under the mantle of
adequacy constitutionalism, Lincoln claimed the authority to do
whatever was necessary to quell the crisis the nation faced. But
the practical effect of his wartime measures, while significant,
was more limited and discriminating than either his political
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rhetoric or official proclamations. The most important limitation
that Lincoln imposed upon himself was that his wartime measures
would end with the war.
From his first address after the firing on Fort Sumter, Lincoln
took care to assure the Union that emergency rule would be
temporary. Lincoln told the special session of Congress that
convened on July 4, 1861 that "after the rebellion [was]
suppressed . . . he probably [would] have no different
understanding of the powers, and duties of the Federal
government, relatively to the rights of the States, and the people,
under the Constitution, than that expressed in the inaugural
address."72 Two years later, in his next important discussion of
constitutional law, Lincoln reemphasized that personal liberties
would be fully restored in "the indefinite peaceful future" that
would begin at the end of the Civil War. The nation had to
swallow harsh medicine in its moment of crisis, but Lincoln
refused to believe, he wrote in another of his folksy analogies,
"that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics
during temporary illness, as to persist in feeding upon them
during the remainder of his healthful life."73 As evidence of
America's unwillingness to tolerate wartime measures
permanently, Lincoln noted that when General Andrew Jackson
suspended habeas corpus in New Orleans in the immediate
aftermath of the War of 1812, "the permanent right[s] of the
people ... suffered no detriment whatever."'74
Lincoln's many wartime orders (and Congress's wartime
enactments) that explicitly terminated at the end of the rebellion
supported such rhetoric.75 But, above all else, the unfettered
functioning of the 1864 presidential race firmly established
Lincoln's commitment to the restoration of peacetime rule after
the war. While elections during national emergencies would
become the norm in United States politics, America's 1864
election was the world's first presidential election held in
wartime, 7 a precedent set despite immense logistical
difficulties77 and although Lincoln knew that the border states
had voted overwhelmingly against him in 1860.78 Before the
1864 election, Lincoln took care to dispel rumors that he would
attempt "to ruin the government" if defeated, publicly pledging
that he would peacefully leave office if he lost at the polls.79 The
election took place a month later without violence or
impediment.80  Days afterward, Lincoln reflected on its
significance in a public address which indicated that even in
Lincoln's expansive view of his war powers, the Constitution
placed real limits on the executive in wartime. The 1864
election, in which the Democratic Party called for the cessation
of hostilities, had threatened to alter the entire course of the war.
If elected, George McClellan, the Democratic candidate, might
have been willing to negotiate a settlement recognizing the
Confederacy.8 In his November 10 address, Lincoln ruefully
acknowledged that during the election the loyal members of the
Union had been "divided, and partially paralyzed, by a political
war among themselves." 2 Nevertheless, he insisted that "the
election was a necessity." We cannot, he declared, "have free
government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us
to forego, or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim
to have already conquered and ruined us.6 3
The 1864 election was an ultimate confirmation that the
Constitution was not only flexible enough to permit the effective
waging of war, but powerful enough to cope with the
unimaginable weight this war placed on democratic processes.
Clear evidence, as Lincoln said, of "how sound, and how strong"
the nation still was," the election announced that democracy
would survive the war." The importance of this assurance
cannot be overestimated. Even before the 1864 election the
knowledge that peacetime rule would eventually be restored
exerted an important check on the Lincoln administration.
Secretary of State William Seward told a friend during the war
that he acted with the knowledge that after the government had
saved the country, it would have to "cast [itself] upon the
judgment of the people, if we have in any case, acted without
legal authority."" Indeed, the influential editor Horace Greeley,
a frequent critic of military arrests of civilians, wanted it to "be
distinctly understood ... that each arrest [would] be made the
subject of rigorous and dispassionate inquiry after peace."
D. Actually Reestablishing the Rule of Law
Although the national leadership maintained a firm and
explicit commitment throughout the Civil War to reestablishing
peacetime rule at the end of hostilities, the transition back was
still difficult and uneven. The draft ended and demobilization
occurred almost immediately and without a hitch,8 but other
wartime measures lingered on. The Milligan decision of 18669
and its aftermath provides perhaps the best example of the
nation's rocky journey back to peace and represents perhaps the
best argument for the deliberate planning of such transitions.
Lamdin P. Milligan, a civilian living in Indiana, was
arrested in 1864 on the order of the local military commandant.
A military commission found him guilty of participating in a
pro-secessionist conspiracy and sentenced him to death.9 In Ex
parte Milligan, the prisoner argued that the military had no
constitutional right to try a civilian when the civil courts of the
state were open and functioning. 9' Two years earlier, when the
Civil War was still raging, the Supreme Court had denied that it
had jurisdiction to review the proceedings of a military
commission.' But, as the Court acknowledged in Milligan, "the
temper of the times," and the concerns of the Court, had
dramatically shifted between 1864 and 1866:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the
times did not allow that calmness in deliberation and
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discussion so necessary to a correct
conclusion of a purely judicial
question. Then, considerations of
safety were mingled with the
exercise of power; and feelings and
interests prevailed which are
happily terminated. Now that the
public safety is assured, this
question, as well as all others, can
be discussed and decided without
passion or the admixture of any
element not required to form a
legal judgment.93
The Court accepted Milligan's case and
his argument that he should be released. 4
Secure in the Union victory, it declared that
constitutional prohibitions applied "equally
in war and in peace ... at all times, and
under all circumstances, ' that neither the
President, nor Congress, nor the judiciary
could infringe on constitutional rights'96
Denying that martial law in civilian areas
had ever been a necessity, the Court













measures, "it could well be said that a country, preserved at the
sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the
cost of preservation." 97 The case marked the Court's transition
back to a peacetime perspective and was an important symbol of
the end of the war. However, this landmark constitutional
opinion had little practical effect. Although civil courts re-
opened almost everywhere in the South soon after Appomattox, 9,
trials by military commission did not end with the war or with
the Milligan decision.
While the Supreme Court had every incentive to discard its
wartime mentality, the rest of the national government had
compelling reasons to want emergency rule to continue. The
Court's embrace of adequacy constitutionalism during the Civil
War prevented it from exercising much of a check on Lincoln or
Congress. Freed from concern for the preservation of the Union,
the Justices had much more discretion and could resume their
cherished roles as defenders of constitutional liberties. In
contrast, wartime controls greatly empowered the other branches
and made their decision-making much easier. The allure such
vestiges of emergency rule had for President Andrew Johnson
and a more powerful postwar Congress did not dissipate simply
because the emergency was over.
The Supreme Court announced its holding in Milligan on
April 3, 1866, one day after President Johnson proclaimed that
the rebellion was entirely suppressed." General Grant, however,
was convinced that Congress had as much
right to order military prosecutions as the
President had to forbid them. Construing
Johnson's proclamation to close only
military courts not established by statute,
Grant authorized army officers in the South
to arrest and hold for military trial civilians
accused of violating state criminal or civil
laws against whom state authorities had
failed to act."0 Grant's order, while in
accord with federal statutes meant to protect
African-Americans from unfair treatment in
southern courts,'0 ' went against Milligan
and perhaps misinterpreted Johnson's
order.' 2 Regardless, the President did not
take action against the general, either
because he did not have the political
strength to oppose the popular war hero or
because he approved of the order. Thus, in
1866, the year of the Milligan decision,
there were 229 military trials of civilians.0 3
Congress, for its part, continued to
authorize military prosecutions on the theory
that only dictum in Milligan implied that
Congress, like the President, did not have
this power. 4 The Military Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867
permitted military trials of civilians where state courts were open
when necessary to protect persons and property, suppress
insurrection, disorder, and violence, or punish criminals.0 5
President Johnson, whose veto of this bill was overridden, argued
that the Act contradicted the Milligan decision."4 Initially, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to the law. In Exparte
McCardle (1869), "7 a Vicksburg newspaper publisher arrested
and awaiting military trial on the charge of encouraging violent
resistance to Reconstruction statutes that aided freedmen, argued
that his confinement was unconstitutional.0 8 Anxious to be rid
of McCardle's suit, Congress repealed the law that provided the
Court with jurisdiction over the case,"° forcing the Court to
dismiss the suit."0 Not surprisingly, military trials increased in
frequency soon after the Military Reconstruction Act's passage. "'
They continued, at a progressively slower rate, until 1870. 112 All
told, there were 1,435 military trials of civilians between the end
of April 1865 and January 1, 1869."'
The postwar history of military trials powerfully illustrates
two interlocking problems that plagued the transition back to
peacetime law at the end of the Civil War and that threatened to
stymie any such transition. First, it indicates the dangers posed
by a weak President or one only weakly committed to ending
emergency rule. Johnson was never as popular as Lincoln or
Grant and never as committed as Lincoln to restoring the rule of
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law. As a Vice President who came to power upon Lincoln's
assassination, Johnson did not begin his tenure with the broad
base of political support popularly-elected Presidents enjoy. A
relatively conservative Democrat, he had few friends in the
Republican-dominated Congress. Beyond such peculiarities,
Johnson, who was not prominent during the war, could not claim
the popular appeal and moral authority of a war hero. Even if he
was eager to end military trials, which is unclear, he lacked the
political power to do so. Thus, such institutions of emergency
rule could continue without the strong executive support that had
been their impetus.
Second, Congress's shortsightedness also largely contributed
to the perpetuation of military trials for years after the Civil War
had ended. Anxious to protect freedmen and southern unionists
from the injustices they faced in southern courts, the postwar
Republican Congress concocted a quick-fix solution without
considering the long-term importance of reestablishing peacetime
law deliberately and systematically. Instead of permanently
restructuring federal jurisdiction to create a system that would
promote equal justice in the South, Congress used wartime
measures for peacetime purposes. Rather than furthering the
reestablishment of the rule of law, the nation's lawmakers ignored
Milligan's clear statement that Congress could not authorize
military commissions to try civilians in peacetime"' and
manipulated the Court's jurisdiction to perpetuate their policies.
As a result, the nation's transition back to peace after the Civil
War was uneven and very slow. Indeed, armed hostilities were
over for thirteen years before Congress definitively ended
emergency rule, having finally come to understand that the
perpetuation of crisis government threatened its interests and
those of the nation.
In 1868, Grant, politically empowered by the heroic military
past Johnson lacked, replaced Johnson as President. He made
full use of his office's still extant emergency powers. Although
the last ex-Confederate state was readmitted to the Union in
1871," President Grant regularly employed federal troops in the
South, throughout his two terms, to enforce Reconstruction
policies, uphold Republican state governments, and maintain the
peace generally." 6 No longer in control as they had been during
the Johnson years, congressmen grew increasingly hostile to such
emergency procedures. Their dissatisfaction with Grant's
continued recourse to the military peaked after the election of
1876, in which Grant sent troops into Florida, South Carolina,
Louisiana, and Virginia with the stated mission of guarding the
canvassers and preventing fraud." 7 The Democratic candidate,
Samuel J. Tilden, won a majority of the popular vote in this
contest, but challenges to the returns from the former three states
left him one vote short of a majority in the electoral college. A
congressionally-appointed commission eventually gave all the
disputed electoral votes to the Republican candidate, Rutherford
B. Hayes."'8 Democrats in Congress charged that Tilden would
have won a clear majority in the electoral college if federal
troops had not directly and indirectly intimidated southern
voters."9 This outcry led to an understanding with President-
elect Hayes that he would remove the remaining federal troops
from the South at the beginning of his term 2 ' and set the stage
for the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which
essentially prohibited the military from engaging in domestic law
enforcement. 2 ' Outraged by the results of the 1876 election but
also generally concerned about military intrusions into domestic
affairs usurping civilian authority,'22 Democrats in Congress were
so determined to enact this statute that they left the army without
appropriations for half a year.'23 The sense of pressing national
emergency had finally passed.
II. The Civil War as Precedent
The Cold War was clearly more than a reprise of the Civil
War. There were significant differences between the two
conflicts, differences which had important consequences for the
fate of liberty during each national emergency. Yet though not
an exact precedent, the Civil War can help us understand
emergency nile in the Cold War, and the years after Appomattox
suggest how a transition back to the law of peace can now be
accomplished.
While the Civil War saw notable transgressions of the
boundary between civilian and soldier, the very nature of the
Cold War blurred this line more seriously. The Civil War was
fought on American soil at clearly defined battle sites, whereas
the Cold War was conducted through a series of proxy, often
covert, wars in other countries. Such secret, distant conflicts did
not produce readily identifiable battlefields or combatants. With
no one marked as particularly obliged to defend the nation, all
became more equally responsible.
Beyond these differences in means, the stakes were higher
during the Cold War. Although the South was devastated by the
end of the Civil War, the North's wartime strategy was always
tempered by the knowledge that the Union army's ultimate
purpose was to reunite the South with the North, not destroy the
region. The South, in turn, could inflict little damage on northern
territory. The Cold War placed no limits on the United States'
desire to thwart Soviet expansionism. The war exposed us to
nothing less than the danger of nuclear annihilation. While the
dueling armies of the Civil War had both believed they were
fighting to uphold the Constitution, the ideological divide
between the United States and the Soviet Union was stark.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, time profoundly
affected the nature of the Cold War. Armed conflict in the Civil
War ceased after four years, with peacetime rule completely
reestablished seventeen years after the war had begun. But
America's Cold War spanned more than four decades, from
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approximately the end of World War II in
1945, to the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991. With hostilities so prolonged and no
end in sight, almost no thought was given
during the Cold War, as it had been given in
the Civil War, to how the nation would
reestablish peacetime rule once the fighting
was over.
Their important differences notwith-
standing, the two conflicts have much in
common. In fact, the precedents of the Civil
War directly influenced the conduct of the
Cold War, with late twentieth-century leaders
systematically using what Lincoln had done
to support what they sought to do a century








were national emergencies that threatened the very existence of
the United States. And both fostered intellectual and structural
changes that led to dramatic expansions of executive power and
to the widespread use of emergency measures.
IH. The Cold War: A Pervasive Sense of Crisis
From the start, the Cold War fostered an overarching sense
of crisis. By 1947, the concern of the nation was focused on the
perceived threat posed by Soviet expansionism. In July of that
year, George Kennan published a highly influential article in
Foreign Affairs that assumed a persistent state of tension between
the United States and the Soviet Union and called for "a long-
term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian
expansive tendencies."'2 5 "Containment" became the dominant
purpose of America's foreign policy. In April 1950, National
Security Council (NSC) Paper 68, the first comprehensive
analysis of the nation's position after World War II, predicted an
indefinite period of foreign relations crisis and recommended a
massive military expansion. The Soviets, the NSC warned, were
seeking to augment their power by absorbing satellites and
weakening any competing system.
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The postulates of NSC-68 were echoed throughout the Cold
War. A quarter century after the writing of that document, former
President Richard Nixon defended his view that Presidents can
take actions in times of crisis that would otherwise be
unconstitutional, by reminding the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence that "[w]e live in imperfect times in an uncertain
world. As a nation we need every possible capability, not merely
to survive, but to be better able to build the kind of world in peace
that has been man's perpetual goal."' 27 Most recently, Oliver
North offered a similar account of the crisis posed by the Cold
War at the Iran-Contra congressional hearings in 1987. North
argued that the Reagan administration's secret aid to anti-
Communist Nicaraguan rebels in violation of statute was justified
because America was "at risk in a
dangerous world." "[W]e all," he sug-
gested, "had to weigh in the balance the
difference between lives and lies."' 8
Such warnings led a remarkable number
of commentators and national leaders to
wonder publicly whether the powers
available to a democratic government were
adequate to combat the menace of
Communist expansionism. The Cold War,
like the Civil War, promoted paradox. The
reigning elite argued that the only way the
country could protect itself from the forces
threatening the survival of the American
democracy was to abandon some of the very
democratic processes which the nation was
fighting to preserve. Indeed, the threat of nuclear war
exponentially intensified the conviction that the government had
to be able to act and react as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Concerned that this emergency might never end, anxious Cold
War leaders called for changes of indefinite duration. As early as
1948, Clinton Rossiter insisted in his influential Constitutional
Dictatorship that the "Atomic Age" necessitated fundamental
constitutional revision. "For all the formidable dangers they
present, for all the knotty problems they pose, the accepted
institutions of constitutional dictatorship are," he wrote,
"weapons which the democracies will henceforth renounce at
their own peril."'29  By 1961, Senator J. William Fulbright
seriously questioned whether government based on separation of
powers was adequate in "a world beset by unparalleled forces of
revolution and upheaval." 3 ° "[T]he price of democratic survival
in a world of aggressive totalitarianism" was, he argued, "to give
up some of the democratic luxuries of the past."'
3'
A. Crisis Government
In response to the pressing sense of crisis and these
mounting doubts about the adequacy of the Constitution's
peacetime strictures, Cold War Presidents moved quickly and
decisively to establish emergency rule. Like Lincoln, they
argued that broad emergency powers were constitutional in times
of national crisis. While Lincoln had primarily focused on the
government's responsibility to guarantee every state a republican
form of government,'32 these Presidents based their claim to
greatly augmented powers on the executive power 3 and
commander in chief clauses" of the Constitution and the
President's supposedly implied power over foreign affairs.'35
Lincoln and the Cold War Presidents agreed, however, that the
executive had the authority to do anything necessary to preserve




[t]he President, who is Commander in Chief and who
represents the interest of all the people, must [be] able
to act at all times to meet any sudden threat to the
nation's security. A wise President will always work
with Congress, but when Congress fails to act or is
unable to act in a crisis, the President, under the
Constitution, must use his powers to safeguard the
nation.
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Guided by such convictions, Cold War Presidents asserted
sweeping emergency authority. In the name of crisis, they vastly
expanded the power the national government exercised over the
lives of its citizens and consolidated this power in themselves.
Truman alone established two of the most intrusive and far-
reaching institutions of Cold War crisis government. Acting
without statutory authorization, he declared by executive order that
the executive branch would systematically screen its employees for
disloyalty and bar the public's access to any government document
whose release might harm the national security.
Truman's comprehensive procedures for investigating the
loyalty of all incumbent and prospective executive branch
employees, preliminarily established as early as 1946, gave
executive officials vast discretion and employees only limited
due process rights.'37 Truman originally determined that the
standard for dismissal would be "reasonable grounds . . . for
belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of
the United States," with "reasonable grounds" defined to include
affiliation with any group "designated by the Attorney General
as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive."' 38 In 1951, the
President lowered this already unforgiving standard to
"reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the
Government of the United States."' 39 While the witch hunts this
loyalty-security program fostered dissipated in the mid-1950S,
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the security clearance system thrived throughout the Cold War.
In 1985, over four million Americans held government security
clearances.'4 ' This number represented over half of all federal
employees and included one and one-half million private
employees whose companies had government contracts.142 On
their own initiative and under their own asserted authority, Cold
War Presidents had created and maintained a system which
dramatically intruded on the privacy of a large portion of both
the public and private work force.
At the same time, Truman was the first of many Cold War
Presidents to shield the government from public scrutiny in a way
it had never been before. Although executive secrecy had existed
in one form or another since the nation's founding,'43 Truman was
the first to apply systematic secrecy controls to the civil
departments of the federal government.' Without citing any
specific statutory authorization, his Executive Order 10,290
empowered executive branch officials to classify all information
which they determined national security required be kept
secret.'45 Although subsequent Cold War Presidents somewhat
modified the sweeping scope of Truman's plan, all asserted their
absolute discretion over classification in time of crisis."46 Such
unilateral control over classification gave Cold War Presidents
the power to protect national security as they saw fit, without
having to secure public, or even congressional, approval.
Perhaps not surprisingly, this unchecked power was abused. The
government radiation tests conducted under the veil of executive
secrecy provide one of the more horrifying examples. Between
1945 and the mid-i 970s, the federal government administered or
sponsored dozens of radiation experiments on Americans on the
theory that the results would help the nation prepare for nuclear
attack. 14 7  Approximately 250,000 Defense Department
personnel'48 and at least 695 private citizens 49 were exposed to
radiation, often without their knowledge or consent. Some of the
principal researchers have defended these experiments as
reasonable and necessary in light of the apparent threat of nuclear
warfare. 5 ' But their choice of subjects suggests that the
government knew that its research might not stand up to public
scrutiny. The radiation experiments disproportionately targeted
unempowered groups with less ability to draw public attention to
their plight. Scientists exposed indigent cancer patients to
whole-body radiation, irradiated prison inmates' testicles, and
served poor pregnant women a drink containing radioactive iron
filings.'' The President's unchecked classification power allowed
conduct which would probably not have survived the light of day
to continue for nearly three decades.
Even when the President did act with congressional
authorization, emergency measures were often implemented with
little consideration given to their termination. To take only the
most striking example, on December 16, 1950, Truman declared
a national emergency in order to manage the mounting Korean
conflict, the first full-scale confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union.'52 By statute, the declaration gave
the President the power
to seize property and commodities, organize and control
the means of production, call to active duty 2.5 million
reservists, assign military forces abroad, seize and
control all means of transportation and communication,
restrict travel, and institute martial law, and in many
other ways, manage every aspect of the lives of all
American citizens."'
Although the Korean War ended in 1953, this state of
emergency, and the extraordinary power it authorized, was not
terminated until the 1976 National Emergencies Act ended all
declared emergencies." 5 In 1962, President Kennedy used the
declaration to justify his embargo against Cuba. 5' As late as
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy
Civil War as Paradigm
1973, the Nixon administration defended
the prolonged life of Truman's declaration,
arguing that the executive authority made
available by the 1950 proclamation "has
been needed during the past two decades
and is still needed." This continuing need,
naturally, resulted "from the very acts and
threats of aggression which the U.S. and its
allies have faced since 1950."'1"6
Such long-lasting states of emergency
would not have been possible, of course,
without congressional assistance. Congress,
by both explicit action and systematic
inaction, largely contributed to the
establishment and perpetuation of crisis
government during the Cold War. Truman's
emergency proclamation was so powerful
because hundreds of statutes gave the
President sweeping powers in declared










reasons the 1950 state of emergency lasted so long were that
Congress did not design its emergency legislation to be self-
terminating and did not remedy the matter of outlived emergency
proclamations until twenty-six years after Truman responded to
the conflict in Korea. By that time, as the congressional report
recommending the termination of all existing states of
emergency noted, "[a] majority of the American people ha[d]
lived all their lives under emergency government."'58 Congress's
emergency legislation had routinized and codified crisis
government.
But direct congressional action like the emergency statutes
was somewhat unusual. 5 9 Congress's dominant foreign relations
strategy during the Cold War, one that ultimately did more than
its emergency legislation to support crisis government, was
consistent acquiescence to presidential assertions of power. This
strategy seems to have been a product of both Congress's sense
that the crises of the Cold War often demanded unimpeded
executive action'" and its ardent desire to avoid the political
liabilities associated with acting as a public check on the
President's power to fight Soviet expansionism." As a result,
by 1967, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations could
rightfully conclude that "it is no longer accurate to characterize
our government, in matters of foreign relations, as one of
separate powers checked and balanced against each other."'62
Although the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare
war,163 provide for the common defense,'" regulate foreign
commerce, 65 and reject treaties,'66 the executive in fact had
"virtual supremacy" over foreign affairs. 67 By deliberate
inaction, Congress allowed the executive to confront the Cold
War unfettered by basic constitutional restraints that the
legislative branch could never have
explicitly surrendered.
This congressional acquiescence,
coupled with the omnipresent sense of
crisis, also led to judicial decisions which
systematically supported the executive in
foreign affairs. While the Court refused to
accept that emergencies create powers in
the first important case of the Cold War,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
(1952),168 this decision contained legal
realist seeds of judicial support for
executive control over foreign policy.
After 1971, the Court consistently upheld
presidential management of foreign
relations, either by sustaining the President
on the merits or by refusing to hear
challenges to executive actions.'69
Youngstown was a definitive rejection
of extra-constitutional crisis government.
To prevent an imminent nationwide strike of steelworkers during
the Korean War, Truman had seized most of the nation's steel
mills without specific statutory or constitutional authority. 7 ' He
claimed that his plenary powers as chief executive and
commander in chief enabled him to take such action in an
emergency.' 7' Cold War anxiety was high in 1952, with many
people predicting that the Korean War would lead to a world war
between the United States and the Soviet Union. But in
Youngstown the Court denied that the President had plenary
authority in an emergency. His powers, the Court held, had to
come "from an act of Congress or from the Constitution
itself.'
'17 2
The Court continued to restrain executive authority in a few
subsequent national security cases,'73 but every Supreme Court
decision after 1971 upheld executive power over foreign
relations. Two major reasons emerge for the President's
consistent success. First, the Court recognized that
congressional inaction inevitably leads to increased executive
control, with such control eventually recognized as appropriate.
Even in Youngstown, the two most enduring concurrences made
this legal realist point. Justice Jackson had "no illusion that any
decision by this Court can keep power in the hands of Congress
if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems.' 74 Justice
Frankfurter deemed it impermissible to ignore "the gloss" which
actual practice had placed on the Constitution. "[A] systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned," of course, created
such a gloss on executive power.75 Second, the sense of crisis
engendered by the perceived necessities of the Cold War
strengthened the tendency of legal realism to support the
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never completely abandoned the rhetoric of congressional
constitutional supremacy in foreign affairs, a perceived, though
not always actual, need for rapid responses to foreign crises
made the equation of congressional silence with approval much
easier to accept.
Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981)76 is a paradigmatic
example of the Court's melding of legal realism with a crisis
mind-set. In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court upheld
President Carter's authority to nullify judicial attachments,
transfer frozen Iranian assets, and suspend private commercial
claims against Iran as part of an executive agreement to free the
American hostages held in Iran, although the Court found no
express statutory basis for the President's suspension of private
claims.177 In supporting this ruling, Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion referred to Justice Jackson's discussion in Youngstown
about the flexibility of the constitutional relationship between
Congress and the President and the "history of congressional
acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the
President."' 78 Rehnquist went on to assert that the executive
agreement was constitutional for two reasons, both related to the
magnitude of the Iran hostage crisis. First, he argued that
Congress's failure to delegate authority over private claims
against Iran to the President should not imply congressional
disapproval because Congress could not have anticipated the
hostage crisis and so had no time to authorize the President
appropriately.'79 Second, Rehnquist implied that the President's
powers in foreign affairs were elastic, expanding in emergencies.
Even if the President did not have plenary authority to settle
claims, Rehnquist argued that
where, as here, the settlement of claims has been
determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution
of a major foreign policy dispute between our country
and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that
Congress acquiesced in the President's action, we are
not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to
settle such claims.'
As this case well-illustrates, the sense that rapid action was
required to protect Americans made it easier for the Court to
attribute less significance to a lack of explicit congressional
authorization. This was the case even where, as here, the crisis
had passed and Congress had had ample time to approve the
President's actions. By the time Dames & Moore was decided,
the hostages had been home for months. Indeed, the hostage
agreement, long in coming, had rather predictable terms, and the
ultimate accord gave the United States six months before the
frozen Iranian assets were to be returned, more than sufficient
time for Congress to approve the transfer. 8'
B. Cold War Battlefields
Cold War Presidents asserted broad, constitutional authority
to meet the persistent threats posed by the Cold War and the
perceived need to respond to these threats as quickly as possible.
These executive assertions, made possible by congressional
acquiescence and judicial tolerance, led to the establishment of a
crisis government in which the duration of the crisis was never
defined. As in the Civil War, the "battlefield" where the wartime
rules applied was extremely expansive. Lincoln's repeated
declarations of authority to enforce wartime controls anywhere in
the United States breached the boundary between civilian and
soldier; but throughout the Civil War, actual battle sites remained
fairly well-defined. While there were some guerilla bands,
particularly in Missouri,'82 soldiers were also generally easy to
identify. In the Cold War, it was often very difficult to say where
the United States was fighting or to recognize the combatants. As
a result, the government could much more effectively define all
areas as potential battlefields and all citizens as responsible for
protecting the nation's welfare.
Much of America's Cold War foreign policy was based on the
twin postulates that the Soviets sought to augment their power by
creating satellite states, and that Soviet expansionism could be
contained by what George Kennan called "the adroit and vigilant
application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting
geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and
maneuvers of Soviet policy."'83 Working on these assumptions,
America pursued its containment strategy in a series of proxy
wars."8 The Cold War view, articulated in a State Department
defense of the legality of the Vietnam War, was that "[an attack on
a country far from our shores [could] impinge directly on the
nation's security."' 85  Almost by definition, these frequent,
undeclared, and often covert wars involved the nation in nearly
constant armed conflict and made separating the sites of war from
the areas of peace, and combatants from civilians, extremely
difficult. 6
Indeed, the government extended emergency rule far into the
domestic realm. Truman's 1950 emergency declaration gave him
and future Presidents the statutory authority to establish crisis
government within the territory of the United States.8 7 In fact, the
executive branch went beyond these congressionally-approved
powers in its domestic battles against Communism. Both the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) systematically spied on United States citizens
in violation of statute. 8 Among other activities revealed in the
1970s, the CIA opened more than 215,000 letters to or from the
Soviet Union between 1952 and 1972."8 The purpose of the FBI's
Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) was, in the words
of one court, to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise
neutralize the activities" of leftists in the United States."
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy
Civil War as Paradigm
While the Supreme Court attempted in
Youngstown to draw clear boundaries
between the battlefield and the homefront, [T her,
as the Cold War progressed it became, in
good legal realist fashion, increasingly reasons
accepting of executive expansion of the abou
area where emergency rule was operative.
In Youngstown, the majority rejected mingli
Truman's argument that his powers as
commander in chief included the authority and mi
to control, during an undeclared war, such
civilian affairs as the operation of the respot
nation's steel mills. 9' As Justice Jackson
articulated the Court's concern in his now-
classic concurrence,
no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would
seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a
President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely
uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly
enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the
country by his own commitment of the Nation's armed
forces to some foreign venture.'92
But "theater of war" was "an expanding concept" in Cold
War America, as Justice Black's majority opinion in Youngstown
noted. 93 Haig v. Agee (198 1)," in which the Court decided a
national security case on the explicit assumption "that grave
problems of national security and foreign policy are by no means
limited to times of formally declared war,"' ' was typical of the
Court's increasingly expansive view later in the Cold War.
Philip Agee, a former CIA agent who embarked on an
international campaign to discredit the agency,'96 had had his
passport revoked by the secretary of state. The Court found that
"[t]he revocation of Agee's passport rest[ed] in part on the
content of his speech."' 97 Nevertheless, it sustained the action,
quoting Near v. Minnesota's argument that "'[n]o one would
question but that a government might prevent.., the publication
of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
troops."" 98 Near, however, had endorsed such prior restraint
"only in exceptional cases," defined as only "' [w]hen a nation is
at war.""' In omitting this important qualifier and deciding that
the emergency rule should apply during the general, persistent
crisis of the Cold War, the Supreme Court only further blurred
the distinction between war and peace.
C. Thinking About the End of the Cold War: There was
"no end in sight."
In the Cold War, as in the Civil War, executive action,






established and maintained crisis
government. During both national
e good emergencies, broad emergency powers
obscured the line between civilian andconcern combatant, the battlefield and the sidelines.icha In the Civil War, however, Lincoln's
insistence that his wartime measures would
of civil not survive the war was firm and explicit.
This commitment to the restoration of
ypolice peacetime rule assumed, of course, that the
war would eventually end. America's Coldilities. Warriors were far less certain that Soviet
expansionism would ultimately be
vanquished. George Kennan's 1947 article
advocating containment was one of the
few, if not the only, important Cold War document to suggest
that the war might not last indefinitely. Kennan took care to
remind his readers that "the possibility remains (and in the
opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power...
bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting
of these seeds is well advanced." ' ° But the comments of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1967 were far more
typical. In the minds of the overwhelming majority of the Cold
War leadership, there was "no end in sight" to the "global
commotions" of the Cold War. America's "involvement in
world crisis" would be of "indefinite duration."' ° With such a
mind-set, planning for the reestablishment of peacetime law after
the collapse of the Soviet Union could only seem irrelevant.
IV. Conclusion
But the Soviet Union did collapse and America was left
unprepared to make the transition back to peace. Above all else,
the Civil War tells us that peacetime rule cannot be reestablished
without deliberate effort and planning, even when the end of the
war is expected. Thankfully, the period after the Civil War also
provides us with some concrete, much-needed lessons about how
to return to the rule of law.
First, though the Supreme Court may have the greatest
incentive to end emergency government, judicial activism will
not be enough. Recognizing that the crisis of the Cold War has
passed would allow the current Court, like the Milligan Court, to
reassert its authority as a co-equal branch and to reaffirm its
celebrated commitment to defending constitutional liberties. At
the same time, the aftermath of the Civil War suggests that
judicial opinions alone do not reestablish peacetime rule. The
Court held in Ex parte Milligan (1866) that military trials of
civilians were unconstitutional where civil courts functioned, but
such trials continued for four more years because Congress and




The executive is generally more able to end emergency rule,
but Presidents coming to office after a major national crisis are
likely to be weak or weakly committed to reestablishing
peacetime law. Since many institutions of Cold War crisis
government were created by Presidents, they could be terminated
by a President's unilateral action. For instance, the chief
executive could reform the security clearance system at his
discretion. But Presidents may be reluctant to surrender their
emergency powers, and executives who enter office after the
resolution of a national emergency may have much less political
strength than predecessors who led the nation to victory.
President Johnson, for instance, did not have the political capital
of either Lincoln, the man who oversaw the Union war effort, or
Grant, the commanding general of the Union army who
ultimately replaced Johnson as President.
President Bill Clinton's tenure well illustrates how the
institutions of emergency rule can become largely self-
perpetuating when post-emergency Presidents lack the power to
halt the machinery of crisis government. The "gays in the
military" controversy of 1993, in which Clinton was compelled
to negotiate with his own Joint Chiefs of Staff and ultimately to
concede to them, 2 represents perhaps the best recent example
of this phenomenon. The Joint Chiefs, who opposed ending the
military's prohibition on homosexual servicemen, gained
leverage in part by mobilizing veterans,2 3 whose numbers had
swelled during the Cold War.2" More importantly, Clinton, who
avoided military service in Vietnam, could in no way match the
moral authority and political power Joint Chiefs Chair Colin
Powell possessed in this area, both with the public and with
Congress.0 5 Indeed, Powell's recent supervision of America's
victory in the Persian Gulf War had made him so enormously
popular that he was frequently mentioned as a potential
presidential candidate who could defeat Clinton at the polls in
1996.20
While Clinton has had great difficulty controlling a military
made powerful and enormous by the Cold War, he too is
attracted to the ease and efficiency of emergency procedures. In
the wake of the April 19, 1995 terrorist attack on the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the most lethal act
of terrorism in the nation's history, Clinton has advocated
amending the Posse Comitatus Act, whose enactment finally
ended Civil War crisis government.2 7 Clinton's proposed
amendment would allow military personnel and equipment to be
used to help civilian authorities investigate crimes involving
"weapons of mass destruction," such as chemical or biological
weapons.2"8 This exemption may be narrowly drawn and
reasonable,2' but there are good reasons for concern about such
a mingling of civil and military police responsibilities. Beyond
the possibility of military usurpation of civilian authority,
servicemen are unfamiliar with the constitutional rights which
guide domestic police work.2 1 0 Perhaps more significantly,
delegating domestic functions to the military appears to be an
implicit acceptance of the current size, power, and resources of
the military, all of which are products of the Cold War.
Clinton's proposed statutory amendment could make a post-
Cold War demobilization even more politically and logistically
difficult.
Ultimately, Congress may be best suited to leading the
nation back to the rule of law, although both the Civil War and
the Cold War suggest that this will not happen automatically.
During the Cold War, Congress benefitted from avoiding
political accountability in foreign affairs. After the Civil War,
Congress wanted to take power back from the President, but was
not interested in dismantling the government's emergency
apparatus. Grown accustomed to the simplicity and speed of
wartime decision-making and reluctant to surrender the powers
the national government had claimed for itself during the Civil
War, it did little to reverse the intellectual and structural
transformations fostered by national emergency. The current
Congress appears willing to accept Clinton's proposed
amendment of the Posse Comitatus Act as an appropriate
response to fears of domestic terrorism.' At the same time,
any congressman who has lived through the Cold War should
realize, as post-Civil War congressmen eventually did, that
emergency rule is ultimately incompatible with legislative
power, that congressional deliberation and compromise do not
survive in crisis government. Moreover, congressmen surely
understand that constraining the President's power over national
security will be much less politically dangerous for them now
that the Cold War is over. Congress should have a strong
incentive to reestablish the rule of law and it certainly has the
power to do so, through its lawmaking and oversight
functions.
Thus far, however, the institutional apparatus of the Cold
War has remained firmly entrenched, although the major
justification for its development has disappeared. The steps the
government has taken to reestablish peacetime law, such as
President Clinton's recent executive order declassifying early
Cold War documents and liberalizing declassification standards,
have been too long in coming and too tentative.2"2 As Senator
Moynihan warned his colleagues in January 1991, constitutional
procedures like Congress's power to decide whether the nation
will go to war
simply eroded in the cold war with the prospect of
nuclear confrontation, permitting no time for
reflection and consultation .... In the aftermath of
the cold war, what we find is a kind of time warp in
which we are acting in an old mode in response to a
new situation."'
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The Cold War lasted for almost five decades. Now is the time to take
action to ensure that emergency rule does not continue for another half
century. The only way we can truly "win the peace" is to reestablish
the democratic rule of law. The lessons of the Civil War can help us.
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